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Abstract—With the fast growth of high-performance comput-
ing, the security of traditional cryptographic secret key estab-
lishment mechanisms are seriously challenged by computing-
intensive attacks. As an alternative, considerable efforts have
been made to develop physical (PHY) layer security measures
in recent years, such as link-signature-based (LSB) secret key
extraction techniques. Those mechanisms have been believed
secure, based on the fundamental assumption that wireless
signals received at two locations are uncorrelated when they
were separated by more than half a wavelength apart. However,
this assumption does not hold in some circumstances under
latest observations, rendering LSB key extraction mechanisms
vulnerable to attacks. The formal theoretical analysis on channel
correlations in both real indoor and outdoor environments are
provided in this paper. Moreover, this paper studies empirical
statistical inference attacks (SIA) against LSB key extraction,
whereby an adversary infers the signature of a target link.
Consequently, the secret key extracted from that signature has
been recovered by observing the surrounding links. Prior work
assumes theoretical link-correlation models for the inference,
in contrast, our study does not make any assumption on link
correlation. Instead, we take machine learning (ML) methods for
link inference based on empirically measured link signatures. ML
algorithms have been developed to launch SIAs under various
realistic scenarios. Our experimental results have shown that
the proposed inference algorithms are still quite effective even
without making assumptions on link correlation. In addition,
our inference algorithms can reduce the key search space by
many orders of magnitudes compared to brute force search. We
further propose a countermeasure against the statistical inference
attacks, FBCH (forward-backward cooperative key extraction
protocol with helpers). In the FBCH, helpers (other trusted
wireless nodes) are introduced to provide more randomness in
the key extraction. Our experiment results verify the effectiveness
of the proposed protocol.
Index Terms—Link signature; key extraction; wireless channel;
PHY-layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret key provides confidentiality and integrity in com-
munication. The establishment of secure secret keys ahead of
transmissions is one of the key issues in the field of infor-
mation security. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
(1976) was the first practical method for establishing a shared
secret over an unsecured communication channel. The security
of Diffie-Hellman protocol is based on the discrete logarithm
problem, whose solution is assumed to be hard to compute.
However, with the fast growth of high-performance computing,
the above assumption is seriously challenged, rendering Diffie-
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Hellman possibly vulnerable to various computation-intensive
attacks.
Realizing the potential vulnerability of Diffie-Hellman, de-
veloping new key extraction mechanisms whose security do
not rely on the computation hardness assumption receives
many attentions. One solution is through PHY-layer security,
which extracts symmetric secret keys from the PHY-layer
channel response of the wireless link (i.e., the link signature)
between the transmitter and the receiver, e.g., see [1], [2],
[3], [4]. The channel response or link signature is considered
to be a good pick for secure key establishment because it is
both reciprocal and uncorrelated. It is reciprocal because it is
usually assumed that when the transmitter and receiver, Alice
and Bob, make measurements on the channel state of the link
between them, their measurements are symmetric (identical).
On the other hand, the channel is said to be uncorrelated
because it is usually assumed that the state of any other link
separated by at least half of a wavelength apart from Alice
and Bob should be independent from that of the link between
Alice and Bob [5]. Based on these assumptions, it is commonly
believed that common keys can be extracted by Alice and Bob
based on their symmetric observation of the channel between
them, while this channel is unobservable by a third party
separated far enough (half a wavelength) from Alice and Bob,
making the extracted keys secure and secrete.
While PHY-layer secret key extraction has been used in
many applications such as encryption and authentication, re-
cent studies have revealed that the uncorrelation assumption
between separated links may not always be valid [6], [7], espe-
cially in many indoor environments where radio propagation
becomes complicated due to signal reflection and multipath.
This opens the door for the statistical inference attack (SIA)
against the link-signature based (LSB) key extraction, because
the correlation between links may be exploited by an adversary
to probabilistically infer the signature of a target link based
on observations over surrounding links. In light of such a
vulnerability, SIA against LSB key extraction has been analyt-
ically studied in prior work, by assuming a correlation model
between neighboring links, e.g., see [6], [7], [8]. However, it
remains to be seen that, in a realistic wireless environment,
without making assumptions on the link correlation model,
how and to what extent SIA may undermine the security
strength of LSB key extraction.
In this paper, we explore the answer to the above questions
by taking a ML approach. We first discuss the correlation
between two wireless channels in both indoor and outdoor
environments. We build two models, indoor and outdoor com-
munication models. According to these two models, the formal
theoretical analysis on the channel correlation is provided.
From the observation of theoretical analysis, we can find that
there are still relative strong correlations even two links are
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2separated further than half wavelength. Thus, it is possible for
the adversary to launch correlation attacks by using the corre-
lation information between the legitimate links and surround-
ing links. Our inference attack against existing key extraction
scheme study roots from empirically measured channel data
and does not rely on any assumption on the link correlation
model. In particular, our study is based on the CRAWDAD
dataset [2], which contains over 9300 measured channel
traces for 1892 links in a 44-node indoor office-type wireless
network. Several possible SIA scenarios are considered. For
each scenario, measured link signatures in CRAWDAD are
divided into two datasets: training data and test data. ML-
based channel inference algorithms are developed. We start
our study from establishing artificial neural networks (ANN)
models for inference. After being trained based on the training
data, these algorithms are instructed to infer the link signatures
in the test dataset. Then, we utilize different ML algorithms,
such as ensemble methods, support vector machine (SVM),
and multivariate linear regression to launch SIA, and compare
the inference performances of different ML algorithms. Our
experiment results show that all these ML algorithms have
approximative inference performance, and thus can effectively
reduce the key search space by many orders of magnitudes
compared to a brutal-force search mechanism.
In light of the above vulnerability, we propose a novel multi-
link Forward-backward Cooperative Key Extraction Protocol
with Helpers (FBCH) in this paper as a countermeasure to
the aforementioned SIA attacks, aiming to make the LSB key
extraction more secure. In particular, by introducing a set of
helpers (these are legitimate nodes assisting the key extrac-
tion process), FBCH allows two communicating terminals to
extract symmetric secret keys based on the combined channel
impulse responses (CIRs) of several randomly selected links.
This is in sharp contrast to the conventional method where
the key extraction is only dependent on the particular link
between the transmitter and the receiver. Consequently, the
resulting key extraction becomes less dependent on a particular
fixed channel, making the aforementioned SIA attacks, which
mainly target the channel between the two communicating
terminals, less effective.
As a summary, the main contributions of this work are three-
fold: (1) We theoretically verify the existence of correlation
between neighboring links in realistic environments, (2) we
suggest empirical methods to exploit the correlation to launch
SIA against LSB key extraction, and (3) we further propose
a countermeasure to weaken the effects of SIA attacks and
make LSB key extraction more secure. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first systematic and empirical study of
LSB key extraction from the SIA perspective in the literature.
Part of this work has been presented previously as a confer-
ence paper in [9]. In contrast to our prior conference paper, the
journal version provides a formal theoretical verification for
the correlation between neighboring links, and also proposes
the FBCH countermeasure to the SIA attacks as well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We re-
view related work in Section II. Section III presents the
background of LSB key extraction schemes and defines the
system model. Section IV analyzes the correlation between
two wireless channels in both indoor and outdoor environ-
ments. We describe the proposed neural network based SIA
attacks in Section V. Section VI evaluates the performance
and effectiveness of the proposed attacks. Section VII presents
the FBCH countermeasures to the inference attacks and we
conclude our work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The idea of exploiting wireless channel characteristics for
generating secret keys has received considerable attention in
recent years. A variety of LSB PHY-layer key extraction
schemes has been proposed, e.g,, [10], [11], [12], [13], [14],
[15], [16]. While the security of LSB key extraction relies
heavily on the uncorrelation assumption of channels, the
validity of this assumption has not been evaluated/verified in
these works.
Theoretical analysis on the correlation among links is con-
ducted in [6], [7]. In particular, these works derive theoretical
link correlation by taking into account the spatial/geometric
relations among the transmitter, receiver, and signal reflectors.
One ring model and the Daggan-Rapport model are employed
to derive the link correlation models under various scenar-
ios. Their main finding is that the uncorrelation-beyond-half-
wavelength assumption is not always valid, and therefore it is
necessary to use larger guard zones around the transmitter and
the receiver for secure LSB key extraction. Unlike [6], [7], our
work derives theoretical link correlation in general indoor and
outdoor environments with the random distributed scatterers.
The research topic of attacks against PHY-layer-based key
extraction systems currently receives limited research input.
Some researchers have reported that the current key extraction
schemes are vulnerable to passive eavesdropping [8], [17] as
well as active attacks [18], [19], [20], [21].
Experimental study on inference attack against PHY-layer
key extraction is considered in [8], where the key extraction
is based on the value of a received signal strength indicator
(RSSI). Inferences in [8] are mainly based on simple averaging
methods and the RSSI observations used for the inference
are made close to the target link (ranging from 6 cm to at
most 90 cm away from the target receiver). In reality, making
inference attack based on overhearing the target channel at
such a close distance may not be practical. Our work considers
a significantly different inference model. In particular, instead
of inferring RSSI, we infer the channel response, which allows
faster key extraction. Furthermore, rather than being a simple
averaging of samples, our inference is based on neural network
algorithms, which enables a much better inference outcome
through training. As a result, our methods support inference
based on observations made much further away from the target
link, ranging from meters to over ten meters, which is of more
interest in practice. [17] also focuses on the passive attacks. It
introduces a new analysis scheme that distinguishes between
jammed and unjammed transmissions based on the diversity
of jammed signals.
Attacks other than SIA have also been considered in the
literature. For example, [22] studies the mimicry attack, where
an adversary replays or forwards legitimate responses from the
transmitter to the receiver. Countermeasures proposed include
time synching responses for verification and randomizing the
training sequence.
In [20], Zhou et al. consider the active attacker scenario.
They assume that Eve is active and can send attack signals
to minimize the key extraction rate of current key extraction
scheme. Eve’s optimal attack strategy is characterized in [20].
3And they propose a scheme for the key extraction in the
two-way relay channel. Instead of estimating CIRs by two
terminals, Alice and Bob, the relay will first establish two
pair-wise keys with Alice and Bob. Then the relay broadcasts
the XOR of these two pair-wise keys to both Alice and Bob.
Alice and Bob can then decode both keys and pick the one
with a smaller size as the final key. This scheme can effectively
prevent against the active attacks. However, it requires the
additional help from relays.
[23] presents a new form of highly threatening active attack,
named signal injection attack. The attacker can inject the
similar signals to both two terminals to manipulate the channel
measurements and compromise a portion of the key. PHY-UIR
as a countermeasure to the signal injection attack is proposed
in this work. In PHY-UIR, both two terminals introduce
randomness into the channel probing frames. Thus, the random
series that are used to extract secret keys are the combination
of randomness in the fading channel and the ones introduced
by users. Then the composed series are uncorrelated to the
injected signals. As a result, the attacker is not able to
compromise the composed secret keys. [21] presents a formal
active adversary model which takes into account an adversarys
knowledge/control of the wireless channel.
We propose SIA attacks without making specific assumption
on link correlation. Rather than being a theoretical study,
we consider our work empirical/experimental, as we use ML
algorithms to make inference based on empirically measured
link signatures in a realistic environment. Moreover, the goals
of our work include not only verifying the existence of
correlation between nearby links, but also exploiting such
correlation for secret key inference through a set of practically
usable methods.
On a different track other than security, channel infer-
ence/estimation has been extensively studied for efficient radio
resource management in wireless networks, e.g., for MIMO
systems [1], [24]. However, such inference/estimation is made
only for the channel between the target transmitter and the
receiver, rather than for channels beside the target link.
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. Multi-path Effect and Link Signature
In wireless communications, radio signals generally reach
the receiving antenna by two or more paths due to reflection,
diffraction, and scattering, which is called multipath propa-
gation. Since different paths have different distances between
transmitter and receiver, a receiver usually receives multiple
copies of the transmitted signal at different time. Different
copies have different attenuations due to the different path
losses. The received signal is the sum of these delayed signal
copies.
A radio channel consists of multiple paths from a transmitter
to a receiver, and each path of the channel has a response
(e.g., distortion and attenuation) to the multipath component
traveling on it, which is called a component response. The
superposition of all component responses is the channel im-
pulse response (CIR). Since the multi-path effects between
different pairs of nodes, as well as channel impulse responses,
are usually different, a channel impulse response between two
nodes is also called a link signature.
B. Key Extraction from Link Signature
Once channel impulse responses have been estimated, the
process of key extraction is rather straightforward. First,
channel impulse responses should be quantized for secret key
extraction since they are continuous random variables. There
are several kinds of mechanisms to quantize link signatures.
In this paper, we adopt the relative simple but widely-used
uniform quantization to quantize CIR measurements [3]. First,
we normalize each CIR with its maximum element value
to obtain vectors of discrete decimals. Next, the resulting
discrete decimals are multiplied with 32 and then are rounded
to the nearest integers. In this way, we obtain vectors of
integers in the range of [0,31], which are the quantization
results of continuous channel impulse responses in integer
representation. Then, the vectors of integer are converted to
their binary presentation. Lastly, N-bit binary string is cut out
from the whole string as the initial N-bit secret key. Figure 1
shows the framework to extract key bits.
Fig. 1: Framework to extract key bits from link signature.
However, the straightforward quantization mechanism usu-
ally is not sufficient. Due to the variation of real environment
and hardware differences between two measurement devices,
it does not guarantee that the pairwise measurements from
two communication ends (Alice and Bob) are identical. In
this case, the sequences of bit keys extracted will not be
identical. Therefore, we should employ an error reconciliation
mechanism to solve this problem. For example, we can apply
challenge-response verification protocol. Let KA, KB are the
bit keys extracted by Alice and Bob, respectively, and φ is a
random number that Alice picked. To launch the verification
protocol, Alice encrypts φ by her secret key KA, and sends
Bob EKA(φ) and Bob responds with EKB (φ+1). If Alice gets
φ+1 after she decrypts Bob’s message, she can conclude that
Bob obtains the correct key. Bob can do likewise. Otherwise,
Alice and Bob will extract bit keys from new measurements,
continue to launch error reconciliation processes until they
obtain the same keys.
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
The existing LSB key extraction schemes have been be-
lieved secure, based on the fundamental assumption that wire-
less signals received at two locations are uncorrelated, when
4they were separated by more than half a wavelength apart.
However, some latest work has observed that this assumption
does not hold in some circumstances [6], [7]. In this section,
we provide a formal theoretical verification for the existence
of correlation between neighboring links in both indoor and
outdoor environments. The important notations used in our
analysis are defined in Table I:
TABLE I: Important Notations
Si The ith scatterer.
θS The angle of arrival (AOA) of the wave traveling from the
scatterer toward the mobile user.
R Radius of scatterer area.
Ω Received link power.
fS(S) Probability density function (PDF) of scatterers in an area.
dUA Distance between the mobile user and attack node.
dRA Distance between the legitimate receiver and attack node.
das Distance between the attack node and the scatterer.
dus Distance between the mobile user and the scatterer.
dRA Distance between the legitimate receiver and the scatterer.
λ Wavelength.
A. Channel Correlation in Outdoor Environment
Fig. 2: Geometrical configuration of the channel model in
outdoor environment.
First of all, the wireless communication in an outdoor cel-
lular system is considered, where a mobile user equipped with
one antenna communicates with a base station (BS), as shown
in Figure 2. To simplify the presentation, but without loss of
generality, we only consider the downlink (i.e., BS transmitting
to the user) in the following analysis. Such consideration is
representative, as realistic cellular communication is usually
dominated by downlink traffic. Moreover, the distance between
the BS and the mobile user is much greater than the distance
between each antenna element of BS, we will treat the BS as
one node in the following discussion. We assume that there is
no scatterer around the BS, since the BS antennas are typically
installed at a high place. Attack nodes (AN) are placed by the
adversary in any potential location. Moreover, we assume that
scatterers are randomly distributed around the mobile user,
inside a circular area A around the user’s receiving antenna
and the attack node, as illustrated in Figure 2. In Figure 2, the
radius of area A is R, and the center of A is the midpoint of
the user and attack node. We further assume that the number
of scatterers is large, and the mobile user and attack node
receive the signal from surrounding scatterers, so the line-of-
sight (LOS) paths are not considered in our discussion. Our
derivation is inspired by the channel correlation analysis in
classical MIMO system, first proposed in [25].
We start our discussion by defining the correlation coeffi-
cient between two neighboring links BS→User and BS→ AN
as follows:
Definition IV.1. The normalized cross correlation coefficient
between the neighboring links BS to User and BS to AN is
expressed as:
ρbu,ba =
E{hbu · h∗ba}√
Ωbu · Ωba
, (1)
where ∗ is the complex conjugate, hbu and hba denote the
received signal at the user and the attack node, respectively,
Ωbu and Ωba are the received link power at the user and the
attack node, respectively.
The received signal hbu between the mobile user and the
BS is given by [26] (the LOS component is neglected),
hbu = lim
N→∞
1√
N
N∑
i=1
gi(d
BS
i · ξi/D)−n/2
· exp{jψi − j 2pi
λ
(dBSi + das)}. (2)
where N is the number of scatterers; gi is the amplitude of
the wave scattered by the ith scatterer; ψi is the phase shift
introduced by the ith scatterer, respectively; dBSi and das are
the distances shown in Figure 2; λ denotes the wavelength. The
term (dBSi · ξi/D)−n/2 accounts for the power loss relative
to the distance D between the user and the BS with path
loss exponent n. The total received power Ωbu of this link is
expressed as
Ωbu = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E{g2i }(dBSi · ξi/D)−n (3)
We assume all links have equal received power, i.e., Ωbu =
Ωba = Ω. By substituting Eq.(2) and Eq.(3) into Eq.(1), the
normalized correlation coefficient between the neighboring
links BS→ User and BS→AN can be derived as follows,
ρbu,ba =
1
Ω
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E{g2i }(dBSi · ξi/D)−n
· exp{−j 2pi
λ
(das − dus)}. (4)
In particular, we assume the scatterers be independently
distributed according to some 2-D probability density function
(PDF) fS(S) on the circular area A as shown in Figure 2.
When N becomes large, the diffuse power scattered by the ith
scatterer has quite small contribution out of the total Ω, which
is proportional to E{g2i }/N . This is equal to the infinitesimal
power coming from the different area dS with probability
fS(S), i.e., E{g2i }/N = fS(S)dS . Therefore, Eq.(4) can be
rewritten in the following integral form:
5ρbu,ba =
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Ω
∫
A
(dBSi · ξi/D)−n
· exp{−j 2pi
λ
(das − dus)}fS(S)dS, (5)
Since we assume scatterers are randomly distributed inside
the circular area A around the user and attack node, Eq.(5)
can be written as
ρbu,ba =
1
Ω
∫ R
0
∫ pi
−pi
(dBSi · ξi/D)−n · exp{−j
2pi
λ
· (das − dus)}f(θS , ξi) d(θS)d(ξi). (6)
where the f(θS , ξi) is the PDF of the locations of scatterers
relative to the user and attack node with θS and distance ξi and
dBSi , θS is the angle of arrival (AOA) of the wave traveling
from the scatterer toward the mobile user.
According to the laws of cosine and sine in [27], we get
d2as = d
2
UA/4 + ξ
2
i − dUA · ξi · cos(θS − θR)
d2us = d
2
UA/4 + ξ
2
i + dUA · ξi · cos(θS − θR)
(7)
and
D
sin(θS − θB) =
ξi
sin(θB)
=
dBSi
sin(θS)
, (8)
where the dUA is the distance between the mobile user and
the attack node.
In the outdoor environment, the assumption of D  R 
dUA is realistic. Therefore, the difference of path lengths can
be approximated as
−(das − dus) ≈ dUA · cos(θS − θR)
dBSi ≈ D
(9)
Substituting the arguments in Eq.(6) with Eq.(7)(8)(9) yields
ρbu,ba =
1
Ω
∫ R
0
∫ pi
−pi
(ξi)
−nexp{−j 2pi
λ
· dUA · cos(θS − θR)}f(θS , ξi) d(θS)d(ξi). (10)
Since the scatterers are uniformly distributed inside the circu-
lar ring, we can use the PDF as f(θS , ξi) = 1/2piR.
Then, we obtain
ρbu,ba =
1
Ω
∫ R
0
∫ pi
−pi
(ξi)
−nexp{−j 2pi
λ
· dUA · cos(θS − θR)} 1
2piR
d(θS)d(ξi)
=
1
Ω
∫ R
0
∫ pi
−pi
(ξi)
−n
2piR
exp{−j2pidUA
λ
∗ cos(θS − θR)} d(θS)d(ξi) (11)
We plot the correlation coefficient ρbu,ba as a function of the
ratio dUA/λ in Figure 3, in which we assume the distance D is
fixed. From this numerical result, it can be observed that there
exists correlation, even if the distance dUA between the mobile
user and the attack node is greater than half wavelength. For
instance, ρbu,ba = 0.21 when dUA is equal to 5 wavelength,
and θR = 1. Moreover, the angle θR affects the correlation
coefficient ρtr,ta dramatically in this model.
dUA / λ
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Fig. 3: Channel correlation coefficient ρbu,ba versus distance
ratio dUA/λ.
B. Channel Correlation in Indoor Environment
In indoor environments, two communication ends, the trans-
mitter (Tx) and the receiver (Rx), generally are not far from
each other and surrounded by scatterers nearby. In this case,
we build a model, in which a big scatterer-ring area A encloses
both the transmitter and the receivers (including attack nodes),
as depicted in Figure 4. In this circular area A, the radius is
R, and the center O is the midpoint of the Tx and ORA,
where ORA is the midpoint of the Rx and the attack node
(AN). In Figure 4, we follow most of the notations as those
defined in Figure 2. Comparing to the outdoor model as shown
in Figure 2, in the indoor model, we substitute the notations
“Tx” and “Rx” for “BS” and “User”, respectively. Moreover,
to facilitate the derivation, we substitute dTSi , dRA, drs and
θT for dBSi , dUA, dus and θB , respectively, and introduce the
new variable γ to denote the angle of the scatterer in the polar
coordinate system, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Fig. 4: Geometrical configuration of the channel model in
indoor environment.
In Figure 4, the correlation coefficient between two neigh-
boring links Tx→Rx and Tx→AN is defined as follows:
6Definition IV.2. The normalized cross correlation coefficient
between the neighboring links Tx to Rx and Tx to AN is
expressed as:
ρtr,ta =
E{htr · h∗ta}√
Ωtr · Ωta
, (12)
where ∗ is the complex conjugate, htr and hta denote the
received signal at the receiver and the attack node, respectively,
Ωtr and Ωta are the received link power at the receiver and
the attack node, respectively
To discuss the correlation between the neighboring links
Tx→Rx and Tx→AN in this model, we still use Eq.(5) to yield
the correlation coefficient function. The Eq.(5) is rearranged
in the indoor model as follows:
ρtr,ta =
1
Ω
∫
A
(dTSi · ξi/D)−n
· exp{−j 2pi
λ
(das − drs)}fS(S)dS, (13)
where Ω is the received link power (equal power for all radio
links is assumed).
According to the laws of cosine and sine in [27], we have
(dTSi )
2 = d2S +D
2/4 +D · dScos(γ)
ξ2i = d
2
S +D
2/4−D · dScos(γ)
(14)
and
sin(θT ) = dSsin(γ)/d
TS
i
= dSsin(γ)/
√
d2S +D
2/4 +D · dScos(γ)
(15)
cos(θT ) = (dScos(γ) +D/2)/d
TS
i
= (dScos(γ) +D/2)/
√
d2S +D
2/4 +D · dScos(γ)
(16)
sin(θS) = dSsin(γ)/ξi
= dSsin(γ)/
√
d2S +D
2/4−R · dScos(γ)
(17)
cos(θS) = (dScos(γ)−D/2)/ξi
= (dScos(γ)−D/2)/
√
d2S +D
2/4−R · dScos(γ)
(18)
By doing the substitution and rearrangements, we obtain the
approximation of −(das − drs) as
− (das − drs) ≈ dRA · (dScos(γ − θR)−D/2 · cos(θR))√
d2S +D
2/4−D · dScos(γ)
(19)
Since the scatterers are uniformly distributed inside the
circular ring, we can use the PDF as fS(S) = f(dS , γ) = 12piR .
Substituting the arguments in Eq.(13) yields the correlation
coefficient ρtr,ta between neighboring links Tx→Rx and
Tx→AN as
ρtr,ta =
Dn
Ω
∫ R
0
∫ pi
−pi
((d2S +D
2/4)2 −D2d2Scos2γ)−n/2
1
2piR
· exp{−j2pi · dRA(dScos(γ − θR)−D/2 · cos(θR))
λ
√
d2S +D
2/4−D · dScos(γ)
}
dγd(dS) (20)
The correlation coefficient ρtr,ta as a function of the ratio
dRA/λ is plotted in Figure 5. It can be observed that there
still exists correlation, even if the distance dRA between the
legitimate receiver and the attack node is greater than half
wavelength. For instance, the correlation coefficient ρtr,ta =
0.26 when dRA is equal to 5 wavelength, and θR = 1.2. In
contrast to the outdoor model, the correlation is a decreasing
function of the angle θR, for a certain distance ratio dRA/λ.
Moreover, comparing to the outdoor model, the correlation
coefficient ρtr,ta is more sensitive to θR.
dRA / λ
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Fig. 5: Channel correlation coefficient ρtr,ta versus distance
ratio dRA/λ.
In conclusion, the wiretap channel (i.e., Tx→AN) and the
legitimate channel (i.e., Tx→Rx) still have relatively strong
correlation, even if the attack node is far away from the
transmitter and receiver (here the “far away” means that the
distance between the attack node and receiver is greater than
λ/2). Therefore, the adversary can infer the secrect key bits
based on his measurements of channel states, which makes
existing key extraction system vulnerable. In the following
section, we propose a class of attacks, called statistical infer-
ence attacks (SIAs), to reveal the vulnerability of LSB key
extraction system.
V. STATISTICAL INFERENCE ATTACK
In the previous section, we have theoretically verified the
existence of correlation between neighboring links. The re-
maining issue is how this correlation may be exploited to infer
secret keys in practice. In this section, we apply several ML-
based algorithms to propose statistical inference attacks (SIAs)
to infer keys by exploiting this correlation. Depending on the
information available for the training of the ML model, we
consider the following three scenarios for SIAs:
(a) Inference based on links disjoint from the target link
(i.e., links of different transmitters and receivers from the
target link)
(b) Inference based on links sharing the same transmitter as
the target link
(c) Inference based on historical signatures of the target link
These scenarios are illustrated in Figure 6, respectively, and
are elaborated as follows.
7(a) Case I: Using links
of different tx and rx
locations.
(b) Case II: Using links
of the same tx loca-
tions.
(c) Case III: Using sig-
natures of the same
link, but measured at
different times.
Fig. 6: Attacks in three scenarios, solid lines denote the target
links, dotted lines denote the existing links.
A. SIA based on disjoint links
This case is pertinent to the scenario where the adversary
has pre-knowledge regarding the area in which the target (i.e.,
the transmitter and receiver of the target link) will appear, but
does not know the exact location of the target until the target
appears. In this case, the adversary may perform a site survey
in the area before the target appears. During the site survey, the
adversary may collect sample signatures of links throughout
the area, and then use these samples to train a model that
represents the signature of an arbitrary link in the area as a
function of the transmitter and receiver locations of the link.
Later in the online inference phase, the adversary can observe
the location of the target, and supply this information to the
trained model to infer the signature of the target link. SIA to
links in a mobile ad hoc network is a typical example of this
scenario.
The topology of ML model for the above link signature
inference is as follows:
Input: S(LT (i), LS(i)), LT (i), LS(i),
Output: S(LT (t), LS(t)),
where
• i = the index of surveyed links,
• t = the index of the target link,
• LT (i) = the locations of transmitters,
• LS(i) = the locations of receivers,
• S(LT (i), LS(i)) = link signatures on the links (LT (i),
LS(i)),
• S(LT (t), LS(t)) = link signature on the target link.
B. SIA based on links sharing the same transmitter
This case applies to the scenario where the adversary does
not know the exact location of the target until the target
appears, but has pre-knowledge on the area in which the
target will appear, and the communication in this area is
through a centralized access point such as a base station or
an AP. Typical examples of such scenario include cellular
network and WLAN. In this case, the adversary can also
survey the area before the target appears, during which he
collects sample signatures of various downlinks throughout the
area. These sample signatures are then used to train a downlink
signature model of the area, which represents the signature of
an arbitrary as a function of the receiver’s location. In the
online inference phase, the adversary observes the location of
the target (the receiver), and supply this information to the
trained model to infer the signature of the target downlink.
The topology of ML model in this case is given as follows:
Input: S(LS(i)), LS(i),
Output: S(LS(t)),
where
• i = the index of surveyed downlinks,
• t = the index of the target downlink,
• LS(i) = the receiver location of the ith surveyed down-
link,
• S(LS(i)) = link signature of the ith surveyed downlink,
• S(LS(t)) = link signature of the target downlink.
C. SIA based on historical signatures of the target link
This case applies to the scenario where the adversary
has pre-knowledge on the exact location of the target. Such
information can be obtained by the adversary by peeking into
the location privacy of the target. This is especially true if the
target’s activity or schedule follows a regular rule.
To infer the signature of the target link at a given time, the
adversary may first measure the signatures of the target link at
different times. The sample signatures are then used to train a
model that represents the link signature as a function of time.
In the online inference phase, the adversary simply feeds the
desired time into the trained model to make inference on the
signature of the target link at that time.
The topology of ML model for this case is given as follows:
Input: S(ti), ti,
Output: S(tc),
where
• i = the index of time,
• ti = time ti,
• S(ti) = link signature at time ti,
• S(tc) = link signature at the target moment.
VI. EXPERIMENT VERIFICATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the
above statistical inference attacks based on the CRAWDAD
dataset[5].
A. The CRAWDAD dataset
In CRAWDAD dataset, over 9300 link signatures are
recorded in a 44-node wireless network, which are measured in
an indoor environment with obstacles and scatters. By moving
the transmitter and receiver between node locations 1 - 44,
it gives the number of transmitter and receiver permutations
counted as 44∗43 = 1892. At each permutation of transmitter
and receiver, 5 link signatures are measured over a period
of about 30 seconds. In this dataset, each link signature is
recorded as a 50-component vector.
B. SIA Results and Analysis
We first evaluate how accurate the proposed ANNs can infer
the signature of a target link. To this end, we randomly pick
a link (a transmitter-receiver pair) from CRAWDAD as the
target link. The five signatures of the target link are used as
ground truth for testing. Training data are selected from the
remaining links in CRAWDAD in the following way. For case-
I SIA, we use all remaining links, in total 9300 − 43 ∗ 2 ∗
5 = 8870 signatures, as training data. For case-II SIA, we
use all the 43 links that share the same transmitter of the
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Fig. 7: Link signature inference accuracy. Note that x-axis denotes index of points, y-axis denotes the amplitude; the solid
lines represent the true link signatures, and dotted line represents our inferred link signature.
target link but have a different receiver as the training data.
So in total 43 ∗ 5 = 215 link signatures are included in the
training dataset for case II. For case III SIA, we randomly
pick 4 signatures of the target link and use them as training
data, and the remaining link signature is used for testing. In a
nutshell, in this experiment we use all relevant data for training
to avoid the complicated issue of training data selection. As a
baseline of the performance, our goal here is to see how well
the ANN can do without discriminating the available training
data. The optimization of the inference, e.g., through training
data filtering, is studied shortly.
Different target links were inferred in our SIA experiments.
Figure 7 plots a typical case for the comparison between the
inferred signature and the ground truth version for the target
link 1 → 4 under the three SIA cases, respectively. The
inferences for other target links present similar trends, and
thus are omitted here due to space limit. Three observations
can be made on Figure 7. First, in all three cases there exists
significant similarity between the inferred signature and the
ground truth, and the trends of curves match quite well. This
observation implies that there are indeed correlations between
neighboring wireless links, even when their separation is
farther than half a wavelength, and these correlations are
harnessed by ANN models in the experiments for inference.
Second, the inferred signature presents different accuracy in
the three cases. This is not surprising, because the inferences
are based on different amount of knowledge about the target.
In particular, training data in case III is the closest to what
is being inferred, and therefore the inference accuracy in that
case is the highest among the three cases. Third, the inferred
signature is much smoother than the truth version. The current
ANN models cannot capture enough high frequency details in
the correlation to make a better inference. This observation
suggests that the ANN models we are using may not be the
optimal ones and there are sufficient rooms for improvement
from a ML’s point of view.
We study the impact of inference accuracy on the security
strength of LSB key extraction as shown in Figure 8. In this
experiment, the goal of the adversary is to figure out, or guess,
the secret key extracted from the true link signature, from the
inferred version of the signature. In particular, we assume that
each time-series point on the true link signature is represented
as a 5-bit binary number according to the quantization scheme
described in Section III.B (32-interval quantization). So in
total a 250-bit binary string can be extracted from the 50-
point true link signature. We pick a 75-bit string as the true
key in our experiment. To guess the true key, the adversary
uses trial and error, starting from the 75 bits quantization of
the inferred signature (5 bits per point, 15 ∗ 5-bit binaries in
total). In each round of trial and error, the adversary explores
the key search space by incrementing or decrementing by one
to one of the 15 ∗ 5-bit binaries, where the exploration is
sequential over the 15∗5-bit binaries. Under such an inference
attack, the security strength of the LSB key extraction can be
measured by the average number of trials needed to find the
true key. Equivalently, this metric can be normalized on a per-
point basis, i.e., measured by the average number of guesses
required to find the true 5-bit quantization for a point on the
link signature.
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Fig. 8: Average number of guesses needed to find the 50 points
in a link signature (ANN).
Figure 8 plots the average required number of guesses for
each of the whole 50 points on a link signature under the three
SIA cases. The average is based on 26 target links randomly
selected from CRAWDAD. From this figure, it can be observed
that for cases I and II on average at most 8 guesses are enough
to find the true quantization of a point using the ANNs. In
contrast, to find a 5-bit quantization, a brutal force search
algorithm needs on average 16 guesses. Therefore, for the 75-
bit key in this experiment, the key search space of the brutal
force algorithm is 1615, or 260. Using the proposed ANNs,
9the key search space is at most 815, or 245: a reduction of 215
compared to the brutal force search! On a computer with 4-
core Intel CPU (2.0 GHz CPU clock speed), it takes about
4,000 hours to find the correct secret key by brutal force
algorithm, however, it takes only about 1 hour and 13 minutes
to find it by our proposed mechanism. Note that this is the
upper bound (worst case) key search space for the case I and
case II SIAs, because the number of required guesses per point
is much smaller than 8 for the points on the tail of the link
signature. For example, only one guess is needed for points
after index 33. Furthermore, it can also be observed that SIA in
case III is able to figure out the true key much more efficiently,
as 90% points can be found in just one guess in that case.
To obtain a statistical view about the strength of the
proposed SIAs, Figure 9 compares the CDF (cumulative
distribution function) of the number of guesses needed per
point under various SIA cases. The CDFs in the figure are
calculated based on the same 26 target links as in Figure 8.
This figure shows that statistically the relative strength of SIAs
are case III > case II > case I. For example, case III can find
90% points in just one round, while 56% points are found in
one round in case II, and only 38% are found in one round in
case I. This trend is aligned with the inference accuracies as
observed in Figure 7.
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Fig. 9: Comparison of inference performance in different cases
by using ANN.
Furthermore, we study the optimization of the inference
accuracy through training data selection in Figure 10. Selecting
the right training data is usually vital to ensure a good
performance of ANN due to the well-known over-training
issue. Because the inference in case III has been very accurate,
here we only focus on the optimization of cases I and II.
For each case, we pick k nearest links to the target link, and
use their signatures (5 ∗ k in total) to train the ANN. Such
a treatment is based on the rationale that a closer link to the
target should possess higher correlation, and thus can provide
better training effects. So now the training data selection is
converted to deciding the optimal size of the training dataset
(i.e., the k). In our experiment we vary the value of k (ranging
from 20 to 44) and evaluate the strength of the resulting attacks
in terms of the CDF of the number of guesses needed to find
a point on the link signature.
Figure 10 plots the CDFs under various training sizes.
It shows that the security strength of SIA in both cases
are sensitive to the size of the training data. For example,
the 75-percentiles in case II may range from 2 to 5 under
various training data sizes, corresponding to a factor of (5/2)50
difference in size of the key search space! This observation
suggests the necessity of optimizing the training dataset in
order to improve the inference accuracy, and hence enforce the
attack strength, of the SIAs. Figure 10 also suggests that the
inference accuracy of the ANN is a non-monotonic function
of the training data size, and there seems to be an optimal
training data size in each case that maximizes the inference
accuracy. For example, the optimal training data sizes are 30
and 37 for case I and case II, respectively.
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Fig. 10: SIA strength vs. training data size (ANN).
To test the inference performances of different ML algo-
rithms, we utilize more ML algorithms, such as ensemble
methods, support vector machine (SVM), and multivariate
linear regression to launch SIAs in case I. Figure 11 plots the
CDFs under different ML inference algorithms. The CDFs in
this figure are also calculated based on the same 26 target
links as shown in Figure 8, and the training data size is 44.
This figures shows that more than 50% points can be found in
just one round by applying multivar linear regress method.
In comparison, less than 40% points can be found in one
round by applying ANN. However, all these ML algorithms
can successfully guess the truth value of each point within 10
attempts. Table II shows that statistically SVM has the highest
inference accuracy, since in average, it just need 2.9 attempts
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to reach truth value of each point. However, when training
data size becomes greater, it will not be efficient enough to
launch SIA by using SVM. In this case, SVM will spend costly
computation and memory resources. In addition, the adversary
has to spend a lot of time to select optimal kernel and adjust
the parameters in SVM.
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Fig. 11: Comparison between different ML inference algo-
rithms in CDF representation.
TABLE II: Summary of statistics for accuracies. Note that the
listed number of attempts and SD represents for each point.
Mean Standard Deviation (SD)
ANN 3.04 2.3997
SVM 2.90 2.4021
Ensemble Method 3.02 2.7018
Mutivar Linear Regress 2.94 2.6564
In our experiment, we apply several general ML algorithms
to launch SIAs. How to improve the inference algorithms,
and analytically decide the optimal training data size, so that
the adversary can construct the best site survey strategy to
maximize its attack strength, remains questions to be explored
in our future study.
VII. COUNTERMEASURE
In this section, we develop a novel LSB key extraction
scheme to defend against the statistical inference attacks.
A. Forward-backward Cooperative Key Extraction Protocol
with Helpers (FBCH)
In conventional LSB key extraction scheme, only the link
between legitimate transmitter and receiver is measured to
obtain CIRs as the random series. Based on the nature of
channel correlation, the adversary can effectively utilize the
channel information of surrounding links to infer CIR of target
link. Our experiments in Section VI demonstrate the search
space of the secret key has been significantly shrunk and
the inference attacks are feasible. To overcome the weakness
of existing scheme, we propose a novel LSB key extraction
protocol, called forward-backward cooperative key extraction
protocol with helpers (FBCH). In FBCH, helpers participate
in key extraction process to construct several channels, and
pass the CIR information between transmitter and receiver by
Algorithm 1 FBCH Protocol
Step 1: The Tx randomly picks N helpers Hi from all of
the M available relays in its transmission range.
Step 2: The Tx broadcasts training symbols under the
standard transmission power PT , each helper Hi receives
signal from the Tx and measures the channel Tx → Hi to
obtain the CIR htx,i.
Step 3: Each helper Hi broadcasts a training symbol under
the standard transmission power PH , the Tx and Rx receive
signals from Hi and measure channels Hi → Tx and Hi →
Rx to obtain the CIRs htx,i, and hi,rx, respectively.
Step 4: The Rx broadcasts a training symbol under the
standard transmission power PR, each helper Hi receives
signal from the Rx and measures the channel Rx → Hi to
obtain the CIR hi,rx.
Step 5: Each helper Hi manipulates its transmission power
to P ′H and transmits training symbol to the Tx under the
transmission power P ′H , where P
′
H =
PH∗hi,rx
htx,i
; the Tx
measures the channel Hi → Tx to obtain the CIR h′tx,i.
Step 6: Each helper Hi manipulates its transmission power
again to P ′′H and transmits training symbol to the Rx under
the transmission power P ′′H , where P
′′
H =
PH∗htx,i
hi,rx
; the Rx
measures the channel Hi → Rx to obtain the CIR h′i,rx.
Step 7: The Tx and Rx utilize the summation
∑
(htx,i +
hi,rx) as random series to extract secret keys.
manipulating their transmission power. Algorithm 1 describes
the procedures of FBCH.
We now detail our key extraction protocol FBCH, which
consists of the following steps:
Let a transmitter Tx and a receiver Rx be the two parties
that wish to extract a key; when Tx wants to establish a secret
key with Rx, the Tx first determines an integer N as the
number of helpers, and randomly picks N helpers Hi from all
of the available relays in its transmission range. The number of
available relays is M . Then the Tx broadcasts training symbols
xT under the standard transmission power PT , the received
signal at each helper Hi from the Tx is given by
yi,tx = PThtx,ixT +N (21)
where N is the additive Gaussian white noise. Thus, each Hi
can measure the channel Tx → Hi and obtain the CIR htx,i.
Then each helper Hi broadcasts a training symbol xi under
the standard transmission power PH , the Tx and Rx receive
signals from Hi, the received signals at the Tx and Rx are
given by
ytx,i = PHhtx,ixi +N (22)
and
yrx,i = PHhi,rxxi +N (23)
, respectively. The Tx and Rx measure channels Hi → Tx and
Hi → Rx to obtain the CIRs htx,i, and hi,rx, respectively.
In the next step, the Rx broadcasts a training symbol xR
under the standard transmission power PR, each helper Hi
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receives signal from the Rx, the received signals at each helper
Hi is given by
yi,rx = PRhi,rxxR +N (24)
Therefore, each helper Hi can measure the channel Rx → Hi
and obtain the CIR hi,rx.
By using power control technology, each helper Hi manip-
ulates its transmission power to P ′H and transmits the same
training symbols xi to the Tx again, where P ′H =
PHhi,rx
htx,i
;
the received signal y′tx,i at the Tx is given by
y′tx,i = P
′
Hhtx,ixi +N
=
PHhi,rx
htx,i
htx,ixi +N
= PHhi,rxxi +N
(25)
When the Tx measures the channel Hi → Tx again, the
CIR h′tx,i that the Tx obtains is given by
h′tx,i = hi,rx (26)
Again, each helper Hi manipulates its transmission power
to P ′′H and transmits the same training symbols xi to the Rx,
where P ′′H =
PHhtx,i
hi,rx
; the received signal y′rx,i at the Rx is
given by
y′rx,i = P
′′
Hhi,rxxi +N
=
PHhtx,i
hi,rx
hi,rxxi +N
= PHhtx,ixi +N
(27)
When the Rx measures the channel Hi → Rx again, the
CIR h′i,rx that the Rx obtains is given by
h′i,rx = htx,i (28)
Since the Tx and Rx obtain the CIRs htx,i and hi,rx in step
3, respectively, they have the agreement that
htx,i + h
′
tx,i = hi,rx + h
′
i,rx
= htx,i + hi,rx
(29)
Therefore, the Tx and the Rx are able to use the summation
N∑
i=1
(htx,i + hi,rx) as random series to extract secret key bits,
where N is the number of helpers. We should note that the
power P ′H and P
′′
H are private and secret information of each
helper Hi, which cannot be revealed to the adversary.
B. Security Analysis
To evaluate the security of the proposed secret key ex-
traction protocol FBCH, in this subsection, we analyze the
performance of FBCH under attack models of SIAs.
First of all, in the FBCH protocol, the Tx and Rx use
the summation
N∑
i=1
(htx,i + hi,rx) to extract key bits (N
is the number of helpers), the number N is secret to the
passive adversary, it is hard for the passive adversary to get
this summation of CIRs for key extraction. Moreover, by
introducing helper nodes, the FBCH protocol deprives the
relevance between one link signature and the corresponding
two locations of Tx and Rx. As a result, in the operational
phase of SIAs, the ML models are not able to provide the
proper group link signatures, since the adversary has no
knowledge about the construction of new channels during its
site survey phase. Likewise, it is hard for the adversary to infer
the key bits in case II and case III of SIAs by applying ML
methods.
Second, we analyze the security strength of FBCH from
the spatial randomness perspective. By launching SIAs, the
adversary has the ability to infer the link signature of any
channel between any two locations. If there exists at least one
attack node that is in close proximity to each helper node (here
the ”close” means that the distance between attack node and
helper is smaller than λ/2), the strong correlation will lead
to the accurate inference of link signature on each legitimate
link. Therefore, the close distance between attack nodes and
helpers will threaten the security of FBCH protocol. We will
study the probability that an attack node is placed very close
to a legitimate node by lucky coincidence.
Since the distributions of attack nodes and legitimate nodes
(i.e., Tx, Rx and helpers) are fully random, the number of
attack nodes that are close to each legitimate node follows
the Poisson distribution. Therefore, we can apply the spatial
Poisson point process to analyze this probability as follows:
The Poisson point process is defined in the plane R2. And
we consider a circular area Bi ⊂ R2 (i = 1...N , and N is the
number of legitimate nodes) for one legitimate node, which
takes the legitimate node as the center and r as the radius. We
treat the attack nodes as points in the plane R2. The number
of points of a point process X existing in this area Bi is a
random variable, denoted by X(Bi). The points belong to a
Poisson process with parameter λ > 0, then the probability of
k points existing in Bi is given by
P{X(Bi) = k} = (λ|Bi|)
k
k!
· exp(−λ|Bi|), (30)
where |Bi| denotes the area of Bi, and |Bi| = pir2; λ is the
density of points in the plane R2.
Given by Eq.(30), the probability that at least one point
existing in Bi is given by
1− P{X(Bi) = 0} = 1− exp(−λ|Bi|)
= 1− exp(−λpir2) (31)
To launch SIAs successfully, there should be at least one
attack node existing in Bi for every legitimate node. Then the
total probability P that at least one attack node existing in Bi
for each legitimate node is given by
P =
N∏
i=1
(1− exp(−λ|Bi|))
= (1− exp(−λpir2))N ,
(32)
where N is the number of legitimate nodes.
It can be observed from Eq.(32) that when the number of
helpers N becomes large or the density of attack nodes λ
becomes small, the probability P becomes small.
In particular, if N gets very large, we obtain
12
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Number of Attempts
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y,
 X
<=
x
No helper
1 helper
2 helpers
(a) Case I
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Number of Attempts
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y,
 X
<=
x
No helper
1 helper
2 helpers
(b) Case II
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Number of Attempts
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y,
 X
<=
x
No helper
1 helper
2 helpers
(c) Case III
Fig. 12: SIA strength vs. number of helpers (SVM).
P = lim
N→∞
(1− exp(−λpir2))N = 0 (33)
Given by Eq.(33), we can observe that when we pick large
enough number of helpers (i.e., N →∞), the probability that
there exists at least one attack node in Bi for each legitimate
node is 0, which implies that there is no possible for the
adversary to launch SIAs successfully.
Obviously, FBCH will exponentially increase the overhead
of communication in the number of helpers during the key
extraction process. Nevertheless, it is an effective countermea-
sure solution to defend against the SIAs.
C. Numerical Results
To illustrate the security strength of FBCH, in this subsec-
tion we study the performance of statistical inference attacks
(SIAs), which we proposed in previous sections, to the new
key extraction scheme. Our experiments are based on the same
setup as in Section VI-B: we use the same CRAWDAD dataset
and launch SIAs in 3 cases. As pointed out in Section VI, sup-
port vector machine (SVM) has the highest inference accuracy
in the previous experiments. To make a fair comparison, we
only use SVM as the ML inference method to launch SIAs.
In this experiment, we first pick N nodes from CRAWDAD
as the legitimate Tx, Rx and helpers, respectively. Further-
more, we randomly pick several links as the transmitter-helpers
(Tx-H) links and helpers-receiver (H-Rx) links. Then we use
the summations of CIRs of these several links, h+h′+ ..., as
ground truth to extract secret keys. Since in each case of SIAs,
the adversary has no knowledge about the helper selection,
he has to infer CIRs on all links according to each potential
helper (the location of each helper is known to the adversary).
For case I SIA, the adversary uses all remaining links in
CRAWDAD to infer the CIRs of potential Tx-H and H-Rx
links and calculate the summation of these CIRs. Then he
uses this summation to guess secret keys, as we mentioned in
Section III-B. Likewise, for case II SIA, the adversary attempts
to infer each potential Tx-H and H-Rx links using links that
share the same receiver but have a different transmitter. And
for case III SIA, the adversary randomly picks helpers and
infer potential Tx-H and H-Rx links (the locations of Tx, Rx,
and each helper are known).
To obtain the statistical view about the security strength
of the proposed protocol FBCH, we study the percentage of
bits in a secret key string that can be inferred, as a function
of the number of attempts. Figure 12 compares the CDF
(cumulative distribution function) of the number of guesses
needed per point under 3 SIA cases. In each attack case, we
vary the number of helpers and use different size of training
data to measure the security strength of the proposed scheme.
This figure shows that the adversary needs more attempts to
find true key, and FBCH can exponentially amplify the the
adversary’s search space. For example, in case I SIA, the
adversary can find 94% points in just 6 rounds when Tx
and Rx use conventional LSB key extraction scheme. On the
contrary, 38% points are found in 6 rounds when there is 1
helper, while 0 point is found in 6 rounds when there are
2 helpers. In particular, FBCH can significantly increase the
adversary’s search space and effectively prevent the SIA in
Case III. For example, when Tx and Rx use conventional LSB
key extraction scheme, the adversary can find 90% true bits in
secret key in just one round, while they cannot find any true
bit in 14 rounds when two or more helpers involve.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In summary, the formal theoretical analysis in channel
correlations have been done relying on both outdoor and
indoor models. Following the machine learning (ML) frame-
work, we have studied empirical statistical inference attacks
against LSB key extraction. Different from prior analytical
work that assumes a link-correlation model, our study roots
from empirically measured channel data and does not rely on
any assumption on the link correlation. We applied several
ML-based methods to launch SIA against LSB key extraction
under various scenarios, and evaluated the effectiveness of
these attacks based on the CRAWDAD dataset. Our finding has
verified the existence of correlation between neighboring links
in realistic environments, and also showed that such correlation
can be practically exploited by ML algorithms to undermine
the security strength of PHY-layer security measures. Upon
investigation, we proposed a countermeasure against the sta-
tistical inference attacks called forward-backward cooperative
key extraction protocol with helpers (FBCH). Our experiments
verify that FBCH is more robust under the statistical inference
attacks.
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